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THE FOREIGN BANK SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF
1991: SHORT RUN CONSEQUENCES EN ROUTE To THE LONG
TERM GOAL
L. Todd Gibson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, in the wake of a few highly publicized scandals,' the
international banking community collectively determined that the policies
governing international banking activities needed to be revisited.2 On
December 19, 1991, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Bank Supervi-
sion Enhancement Act of 1991' (FBSEA), creating a number of changes
in the manner in which foreign bank4 operations are regulated in the
. J.DJM.B.A. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law and Weatherhead
School of Management (1996).
' In two instances foreign banks acted deliberately and fraudulently, exploiting
weaknesses in the international supervision of international banking operations. The
Bank of Credit and Commerce International engaged in extensive money laundering and
fraud. See James R. Kraus & John Evans, BCCI Assets Are Seized in Eight Nations;
Fraud Cited, AM. BANKER, July 8, 1991, at 1. The Banca Nazionale de Lavoro made
close to $3 billion in illegal loans to Iraq, which went to finance weapon sales in
conflict with U.S. policy. See House Banking Staff Questions Foreign Bank Regulations
in BNL Atlanta Scandal, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 612 (Oct. 15, 1990). See also
Statement by William Taylor, Staff Director, Division of Banking Supervision and
Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Committee
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 16, 1990),
reprinted in 76 FED. RESERvE BuLL. 1031, 1032 (Dec. 1990).
2 See Daniel M. Laifer, Note, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of Inter-
national Banking, Post-BCCI, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. 467 (1992). See also Joel P.
Trachtman, Recent Initiatives in International Financial Regulation and Goals of
Competitiveness, Effectiveness, Consistency and Cooperation, 12 J. INT'L L. Bus. 241,
243 (1991) (noting that coordinating international bank regulation is a growing concern
and receiving attention in recent trade liberalization talks).
' Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-242, §§
201-215, 105 Stat. 2236-305 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3111 (Supp. IV 1992))
[hereinafter FBSEA].
4 "Foreign bank means an organization that is organized under the laws of a for-
eign country and that engages directly in the business of banking." 57 Fed. Reg.
12,992, 12,998 (1992) (amending 12 C.F.R. 211.22(m)).
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U.S.,5 and demanding heightened levels of accountability from all foreign
participants.6 The changes reflect the emerging international consensus
that each nation should regulate its marketplace so as to make market
access dependent upon the structure of bank regulation in the international
banks' home country.7 By being the first major marketplace to adopt the
new international standards, the U.S. will be lowest on the learning curve
and potentially cause the most severe consequences as other countries
move to align their banking regulations with the marketplace requirements
of the U.S. By committing the U.S. marketplace to the new progressive
standards, Congress has taken a step towards strengthening the safety and
soundness of the international banking paradigm.
This Note describes the background of foreign banks' presence in the
U.S. market and their initial regulatory framework. Section Im explains
the intent, context and provisions of the FBSEA; Section IV outlines the
international framework which formally emerged six months behind the
FBSEA. Section V explores some of the initial costs and benefits precipi-
tated by the legislation. The Note concludes that while the reform is
strengthening the safety and soundness of international banking, short-
term costs are being incurred, not entirely at the expense of the U.S., but
at that of Latin America's and potentially other emerging markets as well.
II. EARLY PRESENCE OF FOREIGN BANKS
A. Growing Awareness and the International Banking Act of 1978
The first federal investigation into the activities of foreign banks in
the U.S. was by the Joint Economic Committee in 1966.8 At that time,
foreign banks were governed solely by the individual states within which
they were licensed.9 The Joint Economic Committee concluded that due
to the differences between state and federal regulation, and the differences
between each individual state's regulations, it was possible for a foreign
5 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
6 Id.
' International Panel on Banking Revises Minimum Standards, WALL ST. J., July
7, 1992, at C25. See also Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards:
International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 241, 252 (1992) [hereinafter Alford, Minimum Standards].
" S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1421.
9 Henry S. Terrell, U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks: A New Look,
79 FED. RESERVE BULL. 913, 914 (Oct. 1993). Foreign banks were state governed
unless they created a U.S. subsidiary, which was then federally regulated. 12 U.S.C. §
3102(b) (1988).
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bank to gain a competitive advantage over federally regulated domestic
banks.'0
While initially involved only with financing international trade"
(and indirectly gauged by trade balances), foreign banks' roles began to
change during the seventies. In 1973, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 2 (Fed) collected data for the first time on the
foreign bank presence. 3 At that time, sixty foreign banks had $37 billion
in assets 4 in the U.S." This represented three percent of all banking
,o S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 8, at 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1427;
see also H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Cong. 1st Sess., 126 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1939, which indicates that one potential competitive advantage
available to foreign banks at this time resulted from the combination of state chartering
and the lack of significant Federal supervision of foreign banks. The report notes that
"[a]n individual state does not have the authority to ensure that the multi-State
operations are properly supervised." Id. at 106, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1919.
A state granting a license to a foreign bank does not have the authority to cross state
lines and examine the bank's out-of-state-operations (legitimately chartered in the second
state). Therefore, without attention at the Federal level, foreign banks could effectively
branch across state lines, unlike their domestic competitors. Id.
" Trade finance usually takes the form of letters of credit. In international trade
there is always a degree of hesitancy as to who performs first: the buyer or the seller.
The basic function of letters of credit is to act as a means of ensuring payment
to a seller upon shipment of merchandise to a buyer. Under a letter of credit, the buyer
requests his bank to establish a letter of credit in favor of the seller. In the letter of
credit the bank (in place of the buyer) promises to pay the seller a specified amount
if the seller presents documents which evidence that the shipment has taken place.
Joseph A. Colleran, Commercial Letters of Credit, in THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING
HANDBOOK 239 (William H. Baughn & Donald R. Mandich eds., 1983).
"2 In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act into law,
establishing the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System is a network of
12 District Banks (based in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond,
Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas and San Francisco). At
the center are the seven members of the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C.
Governors are appointed by the President for 14-year terms, and confirmed by the
Senate. The governors' terms are staffed so that one term expires every two years.
The purpose of the Federal Reserve is to regulate the supply of money and credit,
and supervise commercial banking. This original purpose has been augmented over time
to now include expectations of controlling inflation and deflation, national economic
growth and stability and always guarding against any financial panic. See THIBAUT DE
SAINT PHALLE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE (1985).
," Terrell, supra note 9, at 913; Daniel B. Gail et al., The Foreign Bank Super-
vision Act of 1991: Expanding the Umbrella of "Supervisory Reregulation", 26 INT'L
LAW. 993, 994 (1992).
"4 The "assets" of banks are "claims issued by deficit-spending units." LLOYD B.
THOMAS, JR., MONEY, BANKING, AND ECONOMIC ACTIvITY 56 (1986). For commercial
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assets in the U.S.'6 Between 1973 and 1978, the number of foreign
banks operating within the U.S. more than doubled to 122, holding $90
billion in assets.'7 This growing number of foreign banks began partici-
pating in more traditional banking activities," and gaining a significant
share of the loans outstanding to large commercial and industrial interests,
thereby moving out of their traditional niche of financing foreign trade. 9
In 1975 the Fed proposed a foreign bank act, but it was not until
1978 that Congress enacted the International Banking Act of 1978"
(IBA). This law was the first substantial step towards formally addressing
and regulating the presence of foreign banks at a federal level.2' The
IBA had two objectives: first, federal regulation of foreign bank activities
and second, formalization of a policy of national treatment.2
In terms of federal regulation, the IBA, for the first time, offered
foreign banks the opportunity to obtain a federal charter,' to establish
federal branches and agencies and to subsequently submit to the imme-
diate supervision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency'
(OCC). Whether state or federally chartered, the Fed assumed a residual
supervisory responsibility over all foreign banks. Furthermore, the IBA
brought foreign banks under the jurisdiction of the McFadden Act" and
the Bank Holding Company Act27 which prohibit banks from branching
throughout the country. Prior to the IBA, foreign banks were not
banks, assets can be classified into three categories: cash items (e.g. cash reserves,
currency on hand), loans (e.g. business loans, consumer loans, home mortgages) and
securities and investments (e.g. U.S. securities, municipal securities). Id. at 126.
'5 S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1422.
16 Terrell, supra note 9, at 913.
17 S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1422.
"S Commercial and industrial loans - C & I loans - are the "principal income-pro-
ducer[s] for commercial banks." THOMAS, supra note 14, at 128.
'9 S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1422.
20 International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988), amended by
12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3111 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
21 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988); see also Ann E. Misback, The Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, 79 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1 (Jan. 1993); Gail,
supra note 13, at 995.
" Gail, supra note 13, at 995.
12 U.S.C. § 3102(a), (f) (1988).
24 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (1988).
12 U.S.C. § 3102(b) (1988). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is
established in 12 U.S.C. § 1.
26 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
8 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (1988) (the Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding
[Vol. 27:119
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covered by these acts, and in 1978, thirty-one foreign banks had estab-
lished operations in three or more states.29
More important than the residual supervision it gained, the Fed
established national treatment as a U.S. policy. The Fed saw national
treatment as both strengthening the domestic marketplace and taking a
first step toward greater global cooperation on such regulatory issues.30
The legislative history of the IBA states that "[t]he climate in which this
bill has been considered is one of relative calm."31 In light of this good-
will, the heart of the IBA is monetary policy and competitive equality,32
and it is less concerned with drum-tight supervision and safe and sound
banking principles."3
Company Act bars interstate branching through the use of bank holding companies).
' The IBA gave the Fed a residual supervisory responsibility over all state-chartered
foreign bank operations, and thus responsibility over these 31 branches and their
respective multi-state organizations. This supervision, however, was mostly ineffective.
The Fed was, for all practical purposes, blocked from examining multi-state foreign
bank operations since the individual states were still the principal regulators of the
operations in their jurisdiction. H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 106, reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1919.
" Statement by John P. LaWare, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, before the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade
and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S.
House of Representatives, November 9, 1993, reprinted in 80 FED. RESERVE BULL. 19
(Jan. 1994) [hereinafter LaWare Statement - Nov. 9, 1993] (discussing the Fair Trade
in Financial Services Act, and how it violates the long standing policy of national
treatment).
The principle of national treatment was established as U.S. policy with
respect to foreign banks by the International Banking Act of 1978. . . . The
U.S. policy of national treatment-which has long set an example to others-seeks
to ensure that foreign and domestic banks have a fair and equal opportunity to
participate in our markets. The motivation is not merely a commitment to equity
and nondiscrimination, although such a commitment in itself is worthy. More
fundamentally, the motivation is also to provide a deep, varied, competitive, and
efficient banking market in which they can satisfy their financial needs on the
best possible terms ...
The U.S. banking market, and the U.S. financial markets more generally,
are the most efficient, most innovative, and the most sophisticated in the world.
It is not a coincidence that our markets are also among the most open to foreign
competition.
Id. at 20.
3, S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1422.
32 Gail, supra note 13, at 995.
31 See S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1422.
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B. Reevaluating the IBA, and continued growth by foreign banks
In 1991, 304 foreign banks held aggregate assets of approximately
$866 billion' across sixteen states.35 Ninety-four percent of these assets
were distributed between 532 state branches and agencies, with the
remaining six percent in eighty-four federally chartered branches and
agencies. 36 The assets in the state branches and agencies constituted al-
most twenty percent of total banking assets in the U.S.37 The aggregate
assets of these foreign banks amounted to thirty percent of domestic com-
mercial loans.38
U.S. and foreign banks have traditionally maintained extensive
activities in branches offshore, typically in the Bahamas or the Cayman
Islands.39 While the Fed has traditionally monitored the status of U.S.
banks' offshore operations," new procedures have been adopted to col-
lect information on the offshore operations of foreign banks' U.S. offic-
es. 4 1 In the first quarterly reports (quarter ending March 31, 1993) col-
lected by the Fed from the foreign banks, over two-thirds42 of total off-
shore assets in these branches were denominated in U.S. dollars and
claimed against either the foreign banks' U.S. offices or other U.S.
addresses. 43 Similarly, fifty-seven percent of liabilities at foreign banks'
offshore operations consisted of U.S. denominated deposits.'
The surprising aspect of this new supplemental report on foreign
banks' offshore operations is that in addition to the $143.7 billion in
3" Gail, supra note 13, at 995.
3' H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 106, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1919.
36 Gail, supra note 13, at 994-5.
37 Id.
" H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 106, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1919.
" The offshore operations afford U.S. customers higher interest rates on deposits
booked at these banking centers, as they have more liberal reserve requirements. Terrell,
supra note 9, at 915.
40 Id. at 916.
41 Id.
42 $222.4 billion in U.S. dollar denominated claims on U.S. domiciled offices, or
other U.S. addresses, of a total of $329.0 billion in total assets. These figures were
gathered only from the offshore branches of non-U.S. banks, and therefore exclude the
non-U.S. banks with subsidiaries in offshore banking centers. Id. at 918.
"3 $187.6 billion liable to U.S. domiciled offices or other U.S. addresses, denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars, out of $329.0 billion in total liabilities. Id. at 918.
44Id.
124 [Vol. 27:119
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FBSEA OF 1991
commercial and industrial loans to U.S. businesses booked at the foreign
banks' branches and agencies in the U.S., another $78.7 billion are
booked at foreign banks' offshore branches.45 The total of $222.4 billion
amounts to almost half the amount that all U.S. chartered banks have
listed in commercial and industrial loans.46 These figures provide surpris-
ing new support to the Fed's assertion that foreign capital provides an
important source of liquidity in the U.S. marketplace.4 7
In the late eighties, even before the offshore operations were accu-
rately quantified, the Fed recognized that the IBA facilitated a competitive
marketplace, but it did not adequately ensure the safety and soundness of
this growing presence of foreign banks.48 At that point it was evident
that only one of two purposes of the IBA - national treatment - had come
into its own. The Fed's residual supervisory power - federal regulation -
was largely unexercised. As an interim measure, the Fed shored up the
lBA's regulatory side by ensuring that foreign banks were included in the
Crime Control Act of 1990"9 for fraud, money laundering and similar
crimes.
Meanwhile, the Fed began to draft a thorough legislative proposal
that would make foreign bank supervision more comprehensive. On May
9, 1991, the Fed introduced draft legislation to the Congressional banking
committees that would provide foreign banks with the same supervision
s U.S. chartered banks have a total of $455.2 billion in commercial and industrial
loans to U.S. businesses. Id. at 918.
Without the inclusion of offshore operations, Japanese banks hold 54.1% of the
foreign owned loans to U.S. businesses. Their market share shrinks to 36.3% when
loans originated offshore are included. France, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, the U.K.
and Italy contribute 11.6%, 10.5%, 8.5%, 6.9%, 5.7% and 3.8% respectively of the
lending to U.S. businesses by foreign banks' U.S. mainland and offshore operations.
The sum of these seven countries' loans amount to 83.3% of foreign commercial and
industrial loans originated by foreign banks. Id. at 920.
Between 1980 and 1990, the Japanese share of lending to U.S. businesses by
foreign banks grew from one-third to two-thirds of the total foreign lending market, and
accounted for 80% of the market's growth. Id. at 920-921.
4' Id. at 918.
4 Statement by John P. LaWare, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation
and Insurance and the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade and
Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House
of Representatives, November 20, 1991, reprinted in 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 31, 34
(Jan. 1992) [hereinafter LaWare Statement - Nov. 20, 1991]. See infra text accompa-
nying note 66.
" See LaWare Statement - Nov. 20, 1991, supra note 47, at 32.
41 Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
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and examination procedures and expectations that domestic banks faced."
Just as the IBA had established national treatment as a U.S. policy, this
legislation was to finally fulfill the IBA's other objective: equivalent
safety and soundness. Over the summer of 1991, the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International and the Banca Nazionale de Lavoro incidents"
highlighted for Congress the gaps in the existing regulatory regime. On
December 19, 1991, Congress passed the FBSEA (largely unamended and
unaltered from its May 9th form), 2 giving the Fed the approval authori-
ty, and direct supervisory authority, over foreign banks seeking state
licenses. 3 For foreign banks seeking federal licenses, the Fed assumed
the responsibility for an entrance examination,' upon which it makes a
recommendation to the OCC.55
III. THE FOREIGN BANK SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1991
A. Legislative Context and Intent
Congress enacted the FBSEA as Title II of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199156 (FDICIA). The
FDICIA was intended to reform the financial services industry and the
federal deposit insurance system in the U.S. 57 More specifically, the
5 Misback, supra note 21, at 2.
"[The FBSEA] ensure[s] that foreign bank operations in this country are regulated,
supervised and examined in the same manner as U.S. banks." Statement by Virgil
Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
before the Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (May 23, 1991), reprinted in 77
FED. REsERVE BuLL. 572, 579 (July 1991) [hereinafter Mattingly Statement - May 23,
1991].
5' See supra note 1.
32 Misback, supra note 21, at 3.
53 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d) (Supp. IV 1992) (giving the Fed approval authority); 12
U.S.C. § 3105(c) (Supp. IV 1992) (giving the Fed examination/supervisory authority).
12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
51 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992) (obliging the OCC to heed the Fed's
recommendation). If a foreign bank's state or federal branch was operating prior to
December 19, 1991 (the date on which the Fed released guidelines for foreign bank ap-
plications for gaining Fed approval), then it was permitted to remain in operation. If
the foreign bank had only obtained state or OCC approval, but had not begun opera-
tions, then it had to apply for Fed approval - and get it - before commencing opera-
tions. Misback, supra note 21, at 5.
36 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
57 H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 95, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1908. The FDICIA was the Bush Administration's attempt at banking reform. See
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FDICIA provided additional resources to the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF)
and strengthened supervision and examinations of federally insured
institutions. 8
1. Title I - Banking Reform.
Title I of the FDICIA recapitalized the BIF 9 which was necessitat-
ed by the unusually large number of S&L failures during the late eight-
ies.' These failures put unprecedented demands on the insurance fund,
eventually tapping out all the reserves.6
In addition to recapitalizing the BIF, the FDICIA strengthens the
capital requirements of the U.S. banking system.62 Simultaneously, the
Bank of International Settlements, in Basle, Switzerland,63 was pushing
new guidelines for the capitalization of international banks.' These
guidelines called for levels of capital significantly higher than most in-
ternational banks could meet at the time.65 Recognizing some wisdom in
America's Banking Battles, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1993, at 81-82.
11 H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 126, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1939.
" The BIF funds the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which in turn provides
federal guarantees to certain retail deposits. H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 95,
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1908.
The retail deposit insurance program came as a result of the crippling bank runs
in the Great Depression. President Roosevelt installed a federal guarantee on retail
deposits to restore depositor confidence by assuring them of the safety of the banking
system, thus ending the panic. Id. at 89, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1902.
In the late eighties, non-bank sources of financing captured a solid portion of low-
risk loans. In order to make up for this shortfall, banks were forced to pursue riskier
portfolios. They did so feeling protected from harm by government insurance. The
economic downturn of 1990 resulted in a number of banks failing, putting increased
demand on the BIF. The FDICIA replenishes the BIF's eroded reserves. Id. at 93, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N at 1906.
o Id. at 92, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1905.
61 Id.
6 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (Supp. IV 1992). The FDICIA does not set specific capital
ratio requirements, but instead sets up a five category system. Banks judged to have
the best capital positions are subject to less regulatory supervision. (Capital requirements
dictate levels and types of capital which a bank must have on its balance sheets.) H.R.
REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 96-7, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1909-10.
See infra text accompanying notes 111 - 122.
See Duncan Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy Standards:
Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK. INT'L L.J. 189 (1992)
[hereinafter Alford, Capital Adequacy].
6 Id.
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the recommended levels, the international banks - including large U.S.
banks - voluntarily committed themselves to attaining these capital posi-
tions.' Congress, also recognizing the wisdom of the capital guidelines
and seizing the momentum that the Bank of International Settlements had
created, embodied capital guidelines of similar (but higher) levels in Title
I of the FDICIA.67
2. Title II - The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act
In effect, as Title II of the FDICIA, the FBSEA seals the nation's
borders, preventing the entry of institutions which cannot demonstrate that
they undergo consolidated' supervision in their respective home country.
In the U.S. all domestic banks, whether state or federally chartered,
undergo comprehensive, consolidated supervision; the FBSEA now
requires that foreign banks assure the Fed that they undergo the same sort
of supervision in their home country.69
In his statement to Congress on November 20, 1991, in support of
the FBSEA, John LaWare, Member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, pointed out that foreign banks have "contributed
significantly to [the] liquidity and depth"7 of the U.S. marketplace.
Acknowledging the need to maintain the presence of foreign banks in the
U.S. marketplace, Mr. LaWare also stressed that the FBSEA only fills
gaps in the "supervisory and regulatory framework governing foreign
banks in this country."71 Furthermore, he emphasized that the FBSEA
continues to extend the policy of national treatment for foreign banks."
6 G-1O Banks Meet Capital Ratio Requirements, Reuters Financial Wire, Sept. 13,
1993, available in LEXIS, Banking News Library, Reuters Financial Wire File.
67 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
"Consolidated" reporting is a financial statement which includes the parent orga-
nization and all affiliates and subsidiaries over which the parent company exerts
substantial control. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.25 (1993).
69 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
70 LaWare Stafement - Nov. 20, 1991, supra note 47, at 34.
7I Id. at 31.
7 Id. While foreign banks are now subject to a layer of regulation that state or
Federal banks are not (i.e. the Fed and its entrance examination and annual examina-
tion), the prudential expectations are now the same for foreign and domestic banks. See
12 U.S.C. § 3105(e), (h) (state chartered banks) and 12 U.S.C. § 3102(b) (federally
chartered banks).
Undoubtedly in this statement, Mr. LaWare was also indirectly responding to
complaints that the FBSEA was just another layer of bureaucracy that would restrict
foreign capital. Although published almost eighteen months after his statement, see Gary
Welsh, Unshackle Foreign Banks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1993, at A20.
[Vol. 27:119
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B. Provisions of the FBSEA
The FBSEA creates four primary changes in the IBA's existing
regulatory regime. 3 The net effect is a comprehensive response to the
concerns about the differences between the individual states' regulation of
foreign banks and the difficulty in monitoring the disparate and growing
foreign presence.74
1. Entry approval
The most prominent provision of the FBSEA is the requirement that
all foreign banks seeking to establish either state or federally chartered
operations in the U.S. receive approval from the Fed to enter the coun-
try." The Fed intends to ensure, through the application procedure (and
subsequent supervision), that only "adequately capitalized and properly
supervised non-U.S. banking organizations are permitted to participate in
the U.S. markets for financial services."" Clearing the Fed's initial or
subsequent review is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for begin-
ning or maintaining operations; a foreign bank must still gain initial and
ongoing approval from the state in which it is chartered.77 If the foreign
bank seeks a national (i.e. federal) charter, the Fed will grant initial
approval, then the OCC must also approve the applicant before the Fed
assumes supervisory and regulatory control."
In taking control of, and consolidating, the market entry requirements
and channels, the Fed accomplishes two important objectives. First, the
Fed takes the responsibility for overseeing all the foreign bank operations
in the U.S. (and has a realistic opportunity for doing so by having all
foreign banks come to it as they enter the country).79 Second, the entry
criteria have been drafted so that upon approval of a foreign applicant,
the Fed can be confident that the foreign bank, and its parent organiza-
tion, are subject to consolidated comprehensive supervision by their home
7' 12 U.S.C. §§ 3104, 3105(c), (d), (e) (Supp. IV 1992).
' See LaWare Statement - Nov. 20, 1991, supra note 47; Mattingly Statement -
May 23, 1991, supra note 50, at 579.
7 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
76 Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Colloquim: U.S. Restructuring Legislation: Revising the
International Banking Act of 1978, for the Worse?, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 41
(1992).
7 12 U.S.C. § 3105(h)(3) (Supp. IV 1992). See also H. REP. No. 330, supra note
10, at 106, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1919.
78 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
- 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
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country supervisor."0 Recognizing the fact that the Fed cannot directly
regulate a foreign branch's parent bank itself, the Fed must utilize this
entry approval process to become confident with the foreign regulator's
framework.8
To be allowed entry into the U.S., the FBSEA establishes two
standards that a foreign bank must meet: 1) "the foreign bank engages
directly in the business of banking outside the United States and is
subject to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis
by the appropriate authorities in its home country," 2 and 2) "the foreign
bank has furnished to the Board [i.e. the Fed] the information it needs to
adequately assess the application." 3 While the second requirement
sounds self evident, it is quite important to the Fed. The language of the
statute allows the Fed a great deal of discretion in interpreting the term
"adequately assess." Through this adequate assessment the Fed hopes to
reach a level of trust in the foreign bank's domestic regulation that is so
important to the Fed finding comprehensive consolidated supervision.
Without comprehensive consolidated supervision, a foreign application
cannot be approved.'" It was the lack of consolidated supervision that
allowed the BCCI to create an octopus-like operation which effectively
eluded supervision, thereby concealing the fraudulent practices for which
that bank was later dissolved. 5
A major difficulty in finding that a specific foreign bank is subject
to comprehensive consolidated supervision is that many countries do not
have a single regulator that the Fed can evaluate, which would allow the
Fed to accept or reject all applicants from that country. The U.S. is an
example of an individual country that does not necessarily have a single
bank regulator supervising all domestic banks. 6 Furthermore, some coun-
12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
This notion of trusting the effectiveness of foreign regulatory regimes is an
emerging international trend. See infra Section IV (A).
82 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
83 Id.
84 The U.S. is not alone in putting such an emphasis on comprehensive consolidated
supervision. See infra Section IV (A).
85 See supra note 1.
86 Currently the Fed, the OCC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Office of Thrift Supervision and the individual states have overlapping regulatory
authority. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c) (Supp. IV 1992). The Clinton administration,
however, has pushed for a consolidation of these agencies. The existing proposal would
merge the regulatory functions of the OCC, OTS and FDIC into a new Federal
Banking Commission. See Kenneth H. Bacon, Fed, Treasury Progress on Plan for Bank
Firms, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1994, at A3. See generally Alan Greenspan, No Single
Regulator for Banks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1993, at A16 (arguing that the country
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tries find it difficult to conclude that their supervision is consolidated; an
example is Mexico. It was not until the North American Free Trade
Agreement was drafted that the Fed determined that Mexican banks were
not supervised on a consolidated basis, and thus were not eligible to enter
the U.S. marketplaceY The Fed, as a result, evaluates foreign bank
applicants on a time consuming case-by-case basis."
To determine whether a specific applicant's home country supervisor
provides comprehensive consolidated supervision in a particular case, the
Fed considers five factors. 9 No factor is determinative, nor is the list
exhaustive, but the factors were included in recognition that different
countries have different financial instruments and that different regulators
employ different definitions."° The factors include:
1) ensuring that individual banks which they oversee have adequate
procedures for monitoring and controlling domestic and international
activities;
2) collecting regular reports (e.g. audits) on the condition of the
parent bank, and the subsidiaries and offices outside the home country;
3) collecting information regarding the relationship between the
parent bank and its foreign and domestic affiliates;
4) collecting financial reports that are consolidated on a worldwide
basis; and
5) evaluating prudential standards (e.g. capital adequacy) on a
worldwide basis.9'
benefits from the overlapping regulatory scheme). But see L. William Seidman, A New
Way to Govern Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1994, at A14 (arguing that the country
would be better served by a single regulatory agency).
" See Statement by John LaWare, Member of Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S.
House of Representatives (Sept. 28, 1993), reprinted in 79 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1031
(Nov. 1993).
' IBR Annual Survey Shows Average Delay 14 Months, THOMPSON'S INT'L
BANKING REGULATOR, Feb. 21, 1994, at IA [hereinafter IBR Annual Survey].
89 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii) (1993).
0 "The Capital Equivalency Report [is] required by the Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991, and also include[s] guidelines the Fed board will use in
converting data of foreign bank capital to its equivalent under U.S. regulations." Basle
Accord, U.S. Capital Standards Compared in Joint Treasury-Fed Report, 58 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 1151 (June 29, 1992). See also Irwin L. Gubman & James S. Keller,
Supervision of Foreign Banks in the United States, R179 ALi-ABA 115, 122 (1993)
available in Westlaw.
91 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii) (1993).
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Beyond the two required standards for entry approval, the FBSEA
suggests four discretionary standards for consideration:'
1) whether the home country authorities have consented to the bank's
proposed U.S. expansion;93
2) "the financial and managerial resources of the foreign bank,
including the bank's experience and capacity to engage in international
banking;"'9
3) whether the bank can continually provide such information that
the Fed deems necessary to ensure compliance with all applicable federal
laws;" and
4) whether the bank is currently in compliance with U.S. law.96
These standards allow smaller foreign banks to demonstrate their merits,
even if they are dwarfed in size and prestige by the Japanese or German
banking giants.97
2. Termination
To effectively maintain control over these foreign branches, the
FBSEA provides that the Fed may terminate the operations of a state
chartered foreign bank office, and recommend to the OCC that it termi-
nate the operations of a federally chartered foreign bank office.98 The
Fed may exercise this option if the foreign bank office: 1) is not subject
to comprehensive consolidated home country supervision;" or 2) if
"there is reasonable cause to believe""° that the office has committed
a violation of law or engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices,
and this violation makes continued operation of the office inconsistent
with public interest."°
92 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
93 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1992).
9' Often in the U.S., bigger banks enjoy misconceptions that their size reflects,
somehow, quality. See H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 96, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N at 1909. (Until the FDICIA, there were policies in place which suggested
that some banks were "too big to fail.")
98 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
9' See infra notes 135-139 and accompanying text, concerning the difficulties
experienced by grandfathered operations of banks lacking consolidated home country
supervision.
1- 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
101 Id.
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3. Deposits
The FBSEA restricts the latitude of foreign banks to take deposits.
Under the FBSEA, retail deposits of less than $100,000 may only be
accepted by foreign banks that have set up an insured U.S. subsidiary. °"
New insured retail branches may not be established by foreign banks;
however, branches existing prior to the FBSEA are grandfathered provid-
ed that they continue to operate in compliance with section 6 of IBA. °3
Uninsured deposits of less than $100,000 are acceptable, so long as they
are wholesale deposits. 0t
4. Examinations and reporting
In order to standardize regulations for state and federally chartered
foreign banks, the FBSEA limits state chartered foreign banks to activities
permitted by the OCC for federally chartered foreign banks. If a state
chartered foreign bank wants to engage in activities permitted by state
law, but not sanctioned by the OCC, the bank must seek specific Fed
approval."° Approval depends on the safety and soundness of the partic-
ular activity. In the case of an insured branch, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation must also determine that the activity poses no threat to
the insurance fund."°
The FBSEA grants the Fed the authority to conduct on-site foreign
bank inspections annually.' These federal examinations supplement the
existing examination by the individual state or OCC. The Fed coordinates
the annual examination schedule of each foreign bank, and has many
options within its authority: it can conduct its own annual examinations;
it can rely on the state or OCC examination results; it can alternate
annual examinations with the state or OCC; or it can coordinate joint
examinations."° With this authority, the FBSEA puts the Fed in the
position of "primary Federal regulator for State licensed branches and
2 12 U.S.C. § 3104(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3104(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3104(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3105(h) (Supp. IV 1992).
10 12 U.S.C. § 3105(h)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3105(h)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. § 3105(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
' Id.
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agencies of foreign banks,""' and thereby effectively reverses the Fed's
former residual supervisory position under the IBA.
IV. THE BASLE COMMrITEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION
At the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland, a
committee entitled the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle
Committee) was formed to address the differences between nations in
domestic and foreign bank regulation and supervision."' The committee
is comprised of representatives from the central banks and regulatory
agencies of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.
A. International Bank Supervision
On July 6, 1992, six months after Congress passed the FBSEA,"'
(and almost a year to the day that the Bank of England closed down the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International"') the Basle Committee set
out minimum standards for the supervision of international banks."' The
guidelines, like the FBSEA, require that every international bank be regu-
lated on a consolidated (i.e. global) basis by its home country regu-
lators."' That is to say that the guidelines prevent any sharing, or split-
ting, of supervisory responsibility between two or more nations over a
bank with international operations." 6 Additionally, the guidelines dis-
courage bank regulators from accepting into their borders those interna-
tional banks that they feel have otherwise insufficient home country
supervision.' The Basle Committee's premise is that no other country
can adequately supervise the cross border operations of a bank if that
"0 H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 10, at 106, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1919.
.. Misback, supra note 21, at 5. In September, 1993, the deputy director of the
Bank of Italy, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, replaced the former president of the New
York Federal Reserve Bank, E. Gerald Corrigan, as Chairman of the Basle Committee.
G-1O Appoint Padoa-Schioppa as Bank Committee Head, Reuters Financial Wire, avail-
able in LEXIS, Banking News Library, Reuters Financial Wire file.
12 The FBSEA was passed December 19, 1991, see supra note 3.
" The BCCI was closed July 5, 1991; see supra note 1.
..4 Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Report on
Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their
Cross Border Establishments, June 1992, reprinted in International Economic Law
Documents, Document II-I, 1992 [hereinafter Basle Committee].
"' Id. at section II-1.
116 Id.
17 Id. at II.
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bank's home country regulators do not sufficiently regulate and supervise
its domestic operations."'
Altogether the Basle Committee guidelines on the minimum standards
of international banking supervision contain four principles:
1) All international banks should be supervised on a consolidated
basis by a home country authority;
2) Prior to the establishment of a non-home country branch or
operation, the bank should receive the consent of the home and host
country banking regulators;
3) Home country supervisors should be able to collect information on
the foreign operations of domestic banks; and
4) Host countries should have the discretion of prohibiting the
establishment of any foreign banking operation if the above guidelines are
not met to their satisfaction." 9
These principles, although agreed upon by all twelve members of the
Basle Committee, are not legally binding.' Former chair of the com-
mittee, Gerald Corrigan, stated at the time these guidelines were issued
that the Basle Committee would rely on the leadership and "moral
authority"'' of the members to see that these guidelines were adopted
on a larger scale."
B. Likelihood of compliance with the supervision standards
Agreements or minimum standards reached by the Basle Committee
are not legally binding articles of international law; rather they are shared
goals for the member countries' domestic banking systems." The cen-
tral bankers of the various nations must still present the agreement or
" 'The BCCI foul-up was made possible by the three-legged race of the regulators.
* . .BCCI's home-country supervisor, the Monetary Institute of Luxembourg, shared re-
sponsibility with the Bank of England, supervisor of BCCI's biggest western operations,
and indeed with the Cayman Islands - so none assumed it." Bank Supervision; Over
the Hills and Far Away, ECONOMIST, July 11, 1992, at 72 [hereinafter Bank Supervi-
sion].
... These principles appear in Basle Committee, supra note 114; and in a summa-
rized format in Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to
Prevent Fraud, 59 Banking Rep. (BNA) 82 (July 13, 1992) [hereinafter Basle Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards].
'" Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards, supra note 119,
at 82.
121 Id.
12 Id.
123 Id.
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standards for the approval of their respective legislatures. In the U.S., the
FBSEA meets the Basle minimum standards for international bank
supervision," and the U.K. is moving towards the implementation of
legislation that would also likely meet the Basle minimum standards.' "
The momentum of these initiatives plus the continuing effort to
homogenize the EC marketplace suggests that it might not be long before
all G-10 countries" meet the Basle Committee's minimum standards.
A look at recent history provides a potentially relevant analogy. Before
the push for standardizing international banking supervision regulations,
the Basle Committee addressed the issue of bank capital.
C. Success of the Capital Adequacy Standards
In its efforts to equilibrate international banking standards, the Basle
Committee, in 1988, issued minimum standards for risk-based capital
("capital"), 27 for all international banking institutions. Due to capital's
role as a reserve against poor earnings and economic downturns (and a
foundation for investor confidence), the Basle Committee viewed capital
requirements as a critical tool in maintaining and standardizing the credit
risk and safety and soundness of all banks." Beyond the issues of
safety and soundness, the Basle Committee recognized that banks should
have competitive equality on a global scale, and that capital requirements
could be an integral part of achieving that equality since capital levels
determine the cost of funds available to a bank.'29 The Committee set
the minimum capital level for internationally active banks at eight per-
cent. 30 Further, the Committee stressed that this figure represented a
'' See Misback, supra note 21, at 6. "The comprehensive consolidated supervision
set forth in the [FBSEA] is broadly consistent with the Basle Minimum Standards, but
may also go beyond the standards in certain respects." Id.
'1 Bank Supervision, supra note 118, at 72.
1' The "Group of Ten" consists of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S.
". Capital consists of subordinated debt, preferred stock and common equity. Bank
capital is different from the common notion of capital. Capital acts as a cushion, or
mini-insurance fund, for banks, whereas in other businesses capital finances the purchase
of property, plant and equipment. The perceived "strength" of a bank is reflected in its
capital position. See Alford, Capital Adequacy, supra note 64, at 190.
'" Id. at 192.
Id. "Capital is an expensive source of funds for banks. An increase in the
amount of capital required by regulators increases the banks' costs of doing business
and restrains their ability to increase deposits or loans." Id. at 193.
'° This figure is eight percent of risk adjusted assets. Id. at 200.
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minimum, and that higher levels were encouraged.'3 ' In a review con-
ducted in 1993, the Basle Committee found that all internationally active
banks in the G-10 countries had met the minimum capital standards by
the end of 1992. '32
Using the capital adequacy standards as an analogy, the prospects for
uniform implementation of the Basle Committee's international banking
minimum standards appear to be good.
V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
If all the G-10 countries adopt the Basle Committee minimum
standards or something similar, the international banking community will
become polarized. Those banks who have consolidated comprehensive
supervision will be able to enter any and all banking markets, while those
banks hailing from countries that lack consolidated comprehensive super-
vision will be effectively blocked from the major marketplaces (i.e. G-10
markets). Over time "in" lists and "out" lists will develop.'33 On the
"in" lists will be all the banks based in the G-10 nations plus a handful
from developing nations that can effectively lobby into existence a su-
pervisory scheme that abides by the Basle notion of comprehensive
consolidated supervision. Developing nations populating the "out" lists
will find themselves out of the important markets of the international
banking community. The result will be a homogeneous, exclusive, inter-
national market for capital which is extraordinarily safe and sound, but
does not easily or readily accommodate transactions between "in" list and
"out" list countries. The consolidated supervision standard, therefore, will
be all but inconsequential to those foreign banks that currently have such
systems in place in their respective home countries. With the exception of
the Fed coordinating examinations, it will be business as usual for these
"in" list banks operating in the U.S."M
131 Id. at 201.
132 G-1O Banks Meet Capital Ratio Requirements, Reuters Financial Wire, Sept. 13,
1993, available in LEXIS, Banking News Library, Reuters Financial Wire File.
, Gubman, supra note 90, at 124.
Fernando A. Capablanca, Making Waves: The Potential Impact of New U.S.
Banking Laws on U.S.Latin American Trade, LATIN FINANCE, Sept. 1993, at TF52,
TF54.
The Federal Reserve Bank has consistently rejected the notion that it has discrimi-
nated against banks from any one region of the world. While this may be true, it
stands to reason that if the FBSEA is applied equally to every country, the results will
create greater hardships to some regions of the world than to others.
Id. at TF54.
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Already, difficulty has arisen with the grandfathering of "out" list
foreign banks, i.e. the foreign banks who were operating in the U.S. prior
to December 1991, and whose continuing operations are grandfathered 35
but whose home country regulators do not provide comprehensive consoli-
dated supervision that would allow other banks from that home country
to establish new operations in the U.S. In the fall of 1993, the Atlanta
Fed severely reprimanded the Banco Boliviano Americano SA. 31 In a
spring 1993 examination of the Bolivian bank in Miami, the Fed deter-
mined that the bank had a number of policy and procedural shortcomings,
none of which would have allowed for money laundering (a common
concern with Latin American banks 137), but amounted to substandard
practices. 13 The Fed ordered the bank to produce an extremely detailed
report of all extensions of credit and statements of internal policy and
procedures. a9 The signal to this foreign bank and those in similar cir-
cumstances, is that even if the home country supervisor does not require
a number of various, detailed reports and ostensibly consolidated supervi-
sion, this host country supervisor does. The Fed has thereby made clear
that it holds all banks, regardless of origin, to the same expectations.
A. Short run costs - stunting the growth of Latin American exports and
Miami's status as an international banking center
Latin America provides the most severe example of the potential
impact that the FBSEA might have on relations with non G-10 countries.
Since the passage of the FBSEA, with its requirement of comprehensive
consolidated supervision, only one Latin American bank has been granted
" "Grandfathering" is an accepted international practice for "protecting investment
in existing foreign banking operations at a time of statutory change." LaWare Statement
- Nov. 20, 1991, supra note 47, at 33. The Fed considers grandfathering an important
national banking policy that lends confidence and stability to market participants. See
id.
36 Atlanta Fed Forces Bolivian Bank in Miami to Meet Strict Guidelines on Loan
Policies, THOMPSON'S INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, Nov. 8, 1993, at 3. In this instance,
the Bolivian bank operated an agency, offering no services which required federal
deposit insurance (and hence put no U.S. taxpayer - i.e. BIF - money at risk). Id.
' "I would estimate that a substantial amount of [foreign bank offshore activity] is
involved one way or another in drug money laundering." Arthur D. Postal, Gonzalez
Marshals Forces in Bid to Stiffen Bank Oversight, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REGU-
LATOR, Apr. 19, 1993, at 1 (quoting interview with Chairman of the House Banking
Committee Henry B. Gonzalez).
"38 Atlanta Fed Forces Bolivian Bank in Miami to Meet Strict Guidelines on Loan
Policies, supra note 136, at 3.
139 Id.
138 [Vol. 27:119
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permission to enter the U.S.,"4 and as suggested above, grandfathered
Latin American branches are coming under close scrutiny. This regulatory
zeal 4' comes at an inopportune time for Latin America. Overall, the
region's economy is expanding; it is experiencing increased Gross Domes-
tic Product'42 and reduced inflation,43 and growing central bank inde-
pendence.'" Consequently, Latin America is one of the fastest growing
export markets, 45 and this growth is generating a tremendous need for
trade financing."4 Scarce financing exists for its increased level of trade,
due in part to the FBSEA 47
U.S. and other G-10 banks are hesitant to loan any money with
extended maturities to Latin American borrowers without government
guarantees, due to the large losses incurred by these lenders during the
early and mid-eighties. 4 Instead, U.S. banks and other lenders are be-
'~ IBR Annual Survey, supra note 88, at 1A.
Latin Banks certainly have plenty to complain about. Of the nine
Latin banks that have banking applications [in] since 1991, only one has
been approved - Banco de Chile in December, 1993. Even the Mexican
banks haven't received the Fed's permission to open offices in the U.S.,
an ironic counterpoint to the recently approved free trade treaty.
Id.
... Mark Sell, International Bank Exams Beefed Up, MIAMI REV., May 3, 1993, at
I (noting that the Fed quadrupled its staff of international bank examiners).
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development stated in its year-
end report that the economic recovery is fueled by private investment and exports, and
that as a region Latin America can expect 3.5% growth in 1994, and 3.7% in 1995.
Latin America Recovery to Continue 1994-95 - O.E.C.D., Reuters Financial Wire, Dec.
20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Banking News Library, Reuters Financial Wire file.
143 Id.
" Federal Reserve Prepares to Begin Dialogue with Banking Regulators in Latin
America, THOMPSON'S INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, Oct. 4, 1993, at 4 [hereinafter
Federal Reserve Prepares to Begin Dialogue].
"4 James R. Kraus, U.S. Banks May Be Missing the Boat on Latin Trade, AM.
BANKER, May 22, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Kraus, U.S. Banks May Be Missing the Boat].
" "Economic progress and liberalization of trade have led to a huge increase in
demand for trade finance in Latin America, but the increase in supply of trade finance
has not been commensurate." Luiga la Ferla & David Easton, Transformed Markets
Make Way for Trade Finance; Latin America Trade Finance: Unprecedented Opportuni-
ty, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 1993, at TF4.
"4 See Capablanca, supra note 134, at TF52.
141 U.S. and foreign banks had to write off billions of dollars in loans after most
Latin American countries, including Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, defaulted.
See James R. Kraus, Latin Economic Gains Seen Spurring Foreign Investing, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 28, 1993, at 9. See also BIS: Short Term Lending Hits Record High
of 52%, LDC DEBT REPORT/LATIN AMERICAN MARKETS, Feb. 21, 1994, at 8. The
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ginning to offer extremely short-term cash, such as six-month lines of
credit. 49 This type of lending however is insufficient to support sus-
tained, long-term growth.150 This is where the FBSEA standards most
noticeably present a restraint to free market machinations; the Latin
American banks cannot expand to the U.S. to finance their growing
domestic market.' Ironically, financing foreign trade was originally the
primary business for foreign banks in the U.S.
Domestically, the lawyers and bankers in Florida are concerned that
the FBSEA has dampened Miami's growth as an international banking
center.'52 Florida's state banking regulators have complained bitterly that
the Fed has first designed a law that is unduly restrictive and second,
begun enforcing it with zeal that borders on usurpation of authority.'
Bank Of International Settlements reports that in 1993, 52% of loans to Third World
countries had maturities of less than one year. This result is spurred by two related
movements: first, total loans outstanding to the public sector (e.g. government bor-
rowers) have declined, and, second, the loans to private sector borrowers are mostly
short-term investments made by international capital markets. Id.
149 James R. Kraus, Latin Economic Gains Seen Spurring Foreign Investing, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 28, 1993, at 9.
"s Sound credit policy dictates that short-term debt finances short-term assets, there-
fore short term lines of credit cannot be used to finance the long term assets the Latin
American countries need in order to support their expanded trade (e.g. factories, equip-
ment, infrastructure). See RICHARD MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACICE, 780-806 (4th ed. 1984).
Some of the more adventurous European banks are entering into trade finance (in
place of the reluctant American lenders), and also underwriting bonds for Latin
American corporations which are placed with large institutional investors in Europe.
James R. Kraus, Germany's BHF to Use N.Y Office as a Springboard for Latin
Expansion, AM. BANKER, Dec. 16, 1993, at 24.
15 U.S. banks cannot establish foreign branches in Latin America - branches that
would be more able to serve Latin American financing needs as a result of their pres-
ence and involvement in the marketplace - because these markets are largely closed to
foreign banks. The U.S. Congress is currently considering the Free Trade in Financial
Services Act (the FTFSA) that would establish reciprocal national treatment. This bill
would restrict U.S. market access available to an institution hailing from a country
which restricts foreign firms' access to its domestic marketplace. While the FTFSA is
aimed more at the Japanese market, the FBSEA has, in a de facto manner, achieved
the FTFSA's intent with regards to the closed markets of Latin America. See
Capablanca, supra note 134.
' Federal Reserve Prepares to Begin Dialogue, supra note 144, at 4.
... James R. Kraus, Florida Aide Assails Fed on Foreign-Bank Role, AM. BANKER,
May 1, 1992, at 21. Most of the small Latin American banks in Miami are not subject
to consolidated supervision and are having difficulty meeting the Fed's prudential
standards as well as demands for documentation. The net effect is that foreign
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B. Long run benefits - standardization of diverse banking legislation
While Latin American trade struggles in the short run, progress is
made towards the Fed's and the Basle Committee's ultimate goal: glob-
alization of safe and sound banking supervisory standards." In the fall
of 1993, the head of Venezuela's central bank announced that
Venezuela's legislature had approved banking legislation which would
provide comprehensive consolidated supervision, complying with the
FBSEA and the Basle Committee's international standards.' 5 Addition-
ally, the new banking regulations eliminated laws that prevented foreign
banks from entering the Venezuelan market.' Approval of the legisla-
tion allows a consortium of Venezuelan banks to renew their application
to purchase an American bank - Eagle National Bank - in Miami. They
withdrew the application in early 1992 because the group's members were
not subject to consolidated supervision.'
As a result of the delay (or impossibility) in getting a Latin
American bank's application through the Fed, several unauthorized indi-
viduals or companies have been representing Latin American banks in
Florida."' Florida's state legislature, consequently, has made its own
initiatives in helping these banks cope with the FBSEA. Legislation has
been introduced that would crack down on the unauthorized representation
of foreign banks, but would also create a new banking-type corporation
that would not be subject to the FBSEA, but would engage solely in
trade financing.' Florida's trade with Latin America has been estimated
to be two-thirds of the state's total," ° and therefore the state has been
extremely proactive in trying to cooperate with Latin American countries,
applications for Florida state banking licenses are down, and voluntary terminations are
up. Id.
' See Alford, Minimum Standards, supra note 7.
,55 James R. Kraus, Venezuela Says New Bank Supervisory Law Satisfies U.S. Re-
quirement, AM. BANKER, Nov. 16, 1993, at 9.
' Id.
7 Kraus, U.S. Banks May Miss the Boat, supra note 145, at 1.
' Florida Revises Laws for International Banks, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REGU-
LATOR, Feb. 7, 1994, at 1.
15 Id.
" Charles Dusseau, A New Opportunity; Mercosur: Achievement and Perspectives,
LATIN FNANCE, Jan. 1994, at 94. In 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uraguay
formed a trading bloc ("Mercado Comun del Sur" or "Mercosur"). Trade between Flor-
ida and these counties totaled $4.5 billion in 1992. Id.
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and help them adopt policies that will facilitate interaction with the
U.S. 161
The Fed, too, recognizes the importance of foreign capital in the
domestic market and the hardship the FBSEA presents for Latin American
banks. 62 In response, the Fed has entered a dialogue with Latin Ameri-
can governments and bank supervisors. 63 In the fall of 1993, a confer-
ence between U.S., Canadian, Venezuelan, Ecuadoran and Bolivian bank
supervisors was held in an attempt to help the Latin American banks
reach the new international supervisory standards, and for the U.S. su-
pervisors to refine and streamline the foreign bank application process."
VI. CONCLUSION
The FBSEA substantially strengthens and consolidates the business
of supervising foreign bank operations in the U.S. marketplace. By
requiring entering banks to be subject to consolidated comprehensive
home country supervision, the FBSEA provides a new measure of safety
and soundness to the U.S. banking market. The Fed recognizes that
some foreign banks are being "locked out of the U.S. market,"'" by
this provision. The immediate cost of this lock out is felt by Latin
American countries, who, due to a lack of consolidated supervision,
cannot establish branches in the U.S. (and, soon, most G-10 countries) to
finance their expanding export sectors. U.S. and other G-10 banks are
reluctant to finance this trade due to the sting of recent losses and the
fact that they cannot enter the Latin markets to oversee any investment in
Latin American trade financing. The unwillingness of the U.S. and the G-
10 countries to allow exceptions to their new banking policies is begin-
ning to force countries without comprehensive consolidated bank supervi-
sion schemes to undertake standardizing reforms. Through the FBSEA and
the Basle Committee's international standards, the G-10 countries have
161 Id.
"6 Federal Reserve Prepares to Begin Dialogue, supra note 144, at 4.
'63 Id.
64 Id.
165 Fraud is extremely hard for any regulatory authority to detect, especially
when bank employees actively conspire to prevent official scrutiny or when
all relevant information relating to the fraudulent activity is maintained
outside the United States. [The FBSEA is] designed to minimize the poten-
tial for illegal activity by creating a bar to entry by questionable organiza-
tions and, in the event that illegal or improper activities are suspected, to
provide as many regulatory and supervisory tools as possible to investigate
and enforce compliance.
Mattingly Statement - May 23, 1991, supra note 50, at 579.
16 Federal Reserve Prepares to Begin Dialogue, supra note 144, at 4.
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used the importance of their collective marketplace to begin to force all
nonstandardized countries to adopt safe and sound, and thus eventually
globally uniform, bank supervision policies.

